“Fighting Infiltrations” enhances the communication battle. Will Tehran manage to isolate Iranians from the world?
Yasmin Ashraf
Tehran is seeking to tighten control over communication channels between Iranians and the outside world through a bill to combat what the government calls “outside infiltration and influence” after Iran’s parliament approved the general principles of a draft that imposes criminal restrictions on communications with foreign media and institutions.
On August 16, Parliament approved the draft’s general principles with a majority of 183 out of 290 deputies, while the details are still being discussed before the text moves to other stages of legislation, including consideration by the Guardian Council.
According to the proposed formula, the project aims to meet, discuss and communicate with media outlets that the authorities assess as “hostile”, especially those linked to or funded by the United States or Israel, with penalties that could reach prison terms of six months to two years.
But the scope of the project goes beyond the relationship between the journalist and the source. The text places restrictions on communications with foreign universities, institutions and organizations and in other cases requires prior notification or formal approval before contacting external parties.
Thus, the issue shifts from monitoring activities, which authorities view as intelligence, to attempts to impose legal restrictions on what Iranians can do or say to the outside world.
From “espionage” to “influence”
Iranian authorities tout the project as a tool to close loopholes that they say allow foreign intelligence services to influence inside the country. This logic is based on expanding the concept of “penetration” to include types of relationships that are not necessarily included in the concept of traditional espionage.
Supporters of the project say that Iran’s laws do contain articles related to espionage and cooperation with hostile parties, but they do not, they suggest, provide a broad framework for confronting what they call “foreign influence.” Therefore, the project seeks to create a broader legal umbrella that may include the media, scientific research, institutional cooperation, and some forms of diplomatic and cultural communication.
This change has a direct political impact: the state not only carries out an action that it considers to be espionage, but also expands the circle of actions that it can consider as a gateway to external influence.
A journalist is in the middle of a battle
The project confronts media workers with one of the most sensitive points. Communication with foreign media can become an activity that requires notification or approval, and communication with outlets deemed “hostile” by the authorities can be punishable by prison terms.
These restrictions come in an environment where the relationship between Iranian journalists and foreign media institutions has become very sensitive. In August, photojournalist Yalda Mayri was sentenced to 15 years in prison after authorities accused her of cooperating with foreign media in the context of her coverage of events in Iran.
It was reported that he was sentenced in absentia and that the decision also included restrictions on his professional and cultural activities and his use of social media.
The development gives the project a dimension that goes beyond the legal text itself, as it comes at a time when authorities are already testing the limits of what Iranian journalists can push abroad.
Universities and culture are in question
The matter does not end with the media. The draft imposes restrictions on scientific cooperation with non-accredited foreign institutions and also expands the scope of supervision to include communication with foreign institutions, organizations and embassies.
This means that dealings with the outside world can shift from a professional, academic or cultural matter to an activity that, in some cases, requires official coverage. This clause has raised concerns among human rights organizations, who believe that the draft’s broad wording could make ordinary civilian and scientific activities subject to security concerns.
These fears were reinforced by increasing pressure on cultural exchanges. In August, Iran’s intelligence ministry accused France of interference and “infiltration” amid a meeting between French diplomats and Iranian designers as part of a cultural activity.
Tehran does not separate the law from the security struggle
The project is taking place in a very tense climate in Iran, after the authorities have increased the level of security regarding any activity that may be related to cooperation with the United States or Israel.
In this way, Tehran is trying to build an internal front that is more closed to what it sees as instruments of external influence, especially the media, digital platforms, and academic and cultural institutions. On the other hand, human rights organizations believe that this expansion confuses the fight against espionage and the monitoring of citizens’ normal communication with the outside world.
Article 19 warns that the draft gives the authorities wider power to monitor and restrict communications, after criminalizing communications with some foreign media and requiring prior consent for other communications.
Can the law close the window?
The dilemma facing Tehran relates not only to its ability to issue tough rules, but also its ability to impose them in a society connected to media, digital and academic networks across borders.
The authorities can criminalize communication and impose fines on those who cross the lines, but they face a digital space that is difficult to fully control and an Iranian society that has wide access abroad through the press, universities, social platforms, family and professional relationships.
The issue is gaining more importance as platforms like Instagram and
On September 3, the UN’s Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran called for the bill to be scrapped, citing its broad and vague wording as requiring Iranians to report and register activities involving foreign agents or citizens, thereby expanding the scope of communication restrictions.
Here comes the main paradox. The more Tehran expands the definition of “penetration”, the wider the circle of communication that can fall into the danger zone. If the stated goal is to prevent foreign intelligence services from exploiting Iranian society, transforming external communication into a security space may have a broader effect: the reduction of information, ideas, and relationships that connect Iranians to the world.
Therefore, the counterattack project not only tests the state’s ability to protect its security, but also tests the limits of its ability to distinguish between security and isolation. The real battle may not be over who is spying on Iran, but who has the right to open Iran’s window to the outside, and who decides when communication with the world becomes truly suspect.